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ORDER MAINTENANCE RECONSIDERED:
MOVING BEYOND STRONG CAUSAL
REASONING
DAVID THACHER*
A backlash has set in against order maintenance policing strategies, if
not among policymakers and the public, then at least among criminologists.
This backlash has several components, but the most prominent rests on
empirical studies that have claimed to cast doubt on James Q. Wilson and
George L. Kelling's broken windows theory-the theory that disorder, left
unchecked, leads to crime by driving residents indoors and sending a
message to would-be offenders that a neighborhood is out of control.' In
this paper I argue that this backlash focuses too narrowly on the broken
windows theory in its assessments of order maintenance policing, and I
develop and apply alternative methods of analysis that focus more directly
on the intrinsic merits of efforts to reduce disorder by using ethnographic
research and normative analysis. In the process, I analyze the few grounded
descriptions of order maintenance practice that have been presented in the
literature to argue that at least some kinds of order maintenance policing are
intrinsically valuable-regardless of the impact they have on serious
crime-because they address important instances of accumulative harms
and offenses.2 Policing inappropriately ignores these problems when it only
focuses on serious crime.
In making this argument, I draw on and extend recent ideas in policy
analysis about the way scholarship can best inform public policy. In current
debates, both opponents and proponents of order maintenance often
presume that its benefits are best judged by its contribution to crime
reduction-by its indirect effects on serious crime, rather than its direct
* Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Urban Planning, University of Michigan. I
would like to thank Ryan Allen, George Kelling, and Martin Rein for helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
I James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38.
2 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS];
JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985) [hereinafter FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS].
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effects on public order. By tying the evaluation of order maintenance
policing so closely to its indirect effects on crime, this literature offers an
example of what Martin Rein and Christopher Winship have described as
"the dangers of strong causal reasoning"-the dangers of policy analyses
that rely on claims that an intervention will have large indirect effects on
some important social problem (e.g., that incentives for marriage will
improve the prospects for low-income children).4 Rein and Winship argue
that claims of this kind ask social science to do too much because it can
rarely identify the tight causal relationships of the kind that would be
necessary; in the meantime, the focus on indirect effects tends to crowd out
questions about the intrinsic wisdom of policy interventions. Order
maintenance policing is a case in point. Since the early empirical studies
that called attention to the order maintenance function' and the scholarly
debates that considered its intrinsic propriety,6 criminologists have paid
little attention to questions about whether order maintenance activities and
the public order they hope to create are desirable in their own right, apart
from their indirect contribution to crime prevention. These questions call
for qualitative study and normative analysis of a kind that recent police
literature has de-emphasized-in particular, for ethnographic study of order
maintenance practice that illuminates what exactly this policing strategy
involves, and for normative analysis that indicates how it implicates the
ideals of liberal political theory. The literature about order maintenance
policing is hardly the only area to neglect these forms of research: similar
3 Thus one recent study concludes that "researchers should further evaluate the
relationship between crime and disorder and should examine the effects that the police can
exert on crime by policing social and physical disorder[]" because "[b]y doing so, they can
determine whether quality-of-life policing is good public policy." Charles M. Katz et al., An
Assessment of the Impact of Quality-of-Life Policing on Crime and Disorder, 18 JUST. Q.
825, 861 (2001).
4 Martin Rein & Christopher Winship, The Dangers of "Strong" Causal Reasoning in
Social Policy, 36 SOC'Y 38 (1999).
5 E.g., MICHAEL BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY (1964); JAMES Q.
WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT
COMMUNITIES (1968); Egon Bittner, Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of
Mentally Ill Persons, 14 SOC. PROBs. 278 (1967); Egon Bittner, The Police On Skid Row: A
Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 699 (1967); Elaine Cumming et al., Policeman as
Philosopher, Guide, and Friend, 12 SOC. PROBS. 276 (1965).
6 E.g., George L. Kelling, Acquiring a Taste for Order: The Community and Police, 33
CRIME & DELINQ. 90 (1987) [hereinafter Kelling, Acquiring a Taste for Order]; George L.
Kelling, Conclusions, in THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT (1981) [hereinafter
Kelling, Conclusions]; Gary W. Sykes, Street Justice: A Moral Defense of Order
Maintenance Policing, 3 JUST. Q. 497 (1986); Samuel Walker, "Broken Windows" and




gaps appear elsewhere in criminology, and indeed in modem social science
more generally.' In that respect, this paper's argument applies more widely
than the order maintenance topic itself, which simply offers a timely
example of how and why criminal justice scholarship should move beyond
strong causal reasoning.
I make these arguments more fully in Part I, and in Part II, I suggest
how scholarship about order maintenance policing could contribute more
broadly to policy debate by drawing on recent ideas about ethical inquiry;
in the process, I offer a tentative argument, based on what little relevant
research exists, that some kinds of order maintenance policing are
appropriate. Part III concludes.
I. STRONG CAUSAL REASONING AND ITS DANGERS
Strong causal reasoning tries to identify policy interventions that,
through a complex causal process, have major indirect effects on some
unequivocally important social outcome. Rein and Winship's paradigmatic
example is school desegregation. When desegregation reached the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Education,8 social scientists came forward with
arguments and evidence claiming that segregated schools had a deleterious
effect on the personal development and educational achievement of black
children, maintaining that these children would learn and develop better in
integrated schools. The Court relied on these social scientific arguments in
its opinion in Brown, but forty years later, the social science theories on
which these arguments relied have come into question, as most research has
been unable to identify large effects of integrated schools on student
achievement. 9
The conclusion that integration only produces small indirect benefits
for black children's learning is, of course, relevant to the debate about
school desegregation. But as in other policy debates where strong causal
reasoning has played a major role, proponents of desegregation often
claimed more than relevance for their arguments. They relied so
extensively on social science theories about the indirect effects of
integration that those effects often appeared to be the major justification for
desegregation. Indeed, the objectivity of social science makes it very
attractive in policy arguments because it holds out the hope of resolving
7 Rein & Winship, supra note 4; David Thacher, Policing is Not a Treatment:
Alternatives to the Medical Model of Police Research, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 387
(2001); Mayer Zald, Sociology as a Discipline: Quasi-Science and Quasi-Humanities, 22
AM. SOCIOLOGIST 165 (1991).
8 374 U.S. 483 (1954).
9 Rein & Winship, supra note 4.
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intractable controversies through neutral methods of rational inquiry. But if
we use causal analyses to bypass those controversies and the causal
analyses come undone, we end up in a difficult position. The social
scientific justification for the intervention has become illusory, and other
issues that deserve attention have been forgotten or de-legitimized. A
return to those issues appears quaint or hypocritical, the last gasp of a
determined partisan who refuses to listen to evidence. Rein and Winship
argue that "this is precisely the situation we are in today with respect to
school desegregation."' 0
[B]ecause of the perceived objectivity of the causal reasoning, the strong predictions
made by social scientists, and the consequences of this for policy design, other
arguments for integration were crowded out. Most importantly, after we change the
rationale and terms of the justifications for the intervention we propose, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to successfully advocate for a position which justifies integration as
an important societal value in and of itself and not merely a means to promote the
education of children.'
BROKEN WINDOWS AS STRONG CAUSAL REASONING
The debate about order maintenance policing has followed a similar
course. Current interest in order maintenance tactics is generally credited to
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling's 1982 article titled Broken
Windows. The Police and Neighborhood Safety.' 2  That article tried to
support order maintenance strategies partly with what Rein and Winship
would describe as a strong causal theory. Building on the work of
psychologist Philip Zimbardo, 13 Wilson and Kelling's theory held that
disorder, left unchecked, sends a message that a neighborhood is out of
control and emboldens would-be criminals to commit serious crime; at the
same time, it drives law-abiding residents indoors, reducing the informal
surveillance and social control that can help to prevent serious crime in
neighborhoods. In short, the theory justifies order maintenance activities by
referring to their indirect effects on serious crime.
The broken windows theory received early support from several
studies designed to test it' 4 and from re-interpretations of past studies.'s
'0 I. at43.
' Id. at 43-44.
12 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 1.
13 PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE HUMAN CHOICE: INDIVIDUATION, REASON AND ORDER VS
DEINDIVIDUATION, IMPULSE AND CHAOS (1969).
14 E.g., MICHAEL MAXFIELD, EXPLAINING FEAR OF CRIME: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1984
BRITISH CRIME SURVEY (1990); WESLEY SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE
SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990); Robert Sampson & Jacqueline
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Moreover, many academics, policymakers, and analysts argued that order
maintenance policing was responsible for a major share of New York City's
remarkable decline in serious crime. 16 Partly on the basis of these claims,
hundreds of police departments around the country placed more emphasis
on order maintenance strategies.
Over the past few years, however, social science has not been kind to
the broken windows theory. A number of scholars reanalyzed the initial
studies that appeared to support it, arguing in particular that Wesley
Skogan's seminal study of the relationship between disorder and crime did
not demonstrate the strong relationship that broken window proponents
have claimed. 17  Others pressed forward with new, more sophisticated
studies of the relationship between disorder and crime.'" The most
prominent among them concluded that the relationship between disorder
and serious crime is modest, and even that relationship is largely an artifact
of more fundamental social forces.' 9 Still other social scientists have
questioned the effect that New York City's police strategies had on that
Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension,
22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163 (1988).
'5 E.g., James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 367 (1978).
16 E.g., WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S TOP CoP
REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998); George Kelling & William Sousa, Do Police
Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms, 22 Civic REP. 1
(2001).
17 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
18 E.g., RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS: BALTIMORE
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME, FEAR, AND DECLINE
(2001); Katz et al., supra note 3; Kenneth J. Novak et al., The Effects ofAggressive Policing
of Disorder on Serious Crime, 22 POLICING 171 (1999); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W.
Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in
Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603 (1999).
19 Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 18. Note, however, that Sampson and
Raudenbush's study did not in any sense disprove the broken windows theory. Broken
windows offers a theory of policing, claiming that if police intervene in minor disorder they
will stave off serious crime down the road. By contrast, Sampson and Raudenbush (to
simplify only a little) offer an important criminological study of the natural relationship
between disorder and crime, concluding that the two phenomena do covary in time and
space, but that common social factors drive that covariation in the Chicago neighborhoods
they studied. This conclusion does not directly challenge broken windows because it omits
policing practice as an explanatory variable. The policy question posed by broken windows
is whether police intervention into the natural process that links crime, disorder, and other
social factors can alter the level of crime that results from that process. Since police practice
did not vary across Chicago neighborhoods (or at least Sampson and Raudenbush did not
study that variation), their research, while important for other reasons, does not speak
directly to the broken windows hypothesis.
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city's crime trends, arguing that factors like the decline of crack cocaine
played larger roles than order maintenance, and that other cities that have
not implemented order maintenance tactics have achieved comparable
reductions in crime.20
These challenges to the broken windows theory have not yet
discredited order maintenance policing with policymakers or the public.
But among criminologists, order maintenance is clearly under siege. Thus
Sampson and Raudenbush argue that"current fascination in policy circles
... on cleaning up disorder through law enforcement techniques appears
simplistic and largely misplaced, at least in terms of directly fighting crime
.... Attacking public disorder through tough police tactics may thus be a
politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce
crime .... ,21 Their conclusions have been echoed (and often quoted) by
other academic commentators on order maintenance policing. These
criticisms, like much of the sea change in opinion against order
maintenance policing, rest on the empirical critique of the broken windows
theory-on the recent evidence that claims to show that disorder and the
order maintenance strategies designed to reduce it may not have large
effects on serious crime.
In the process of making these critiques, scholars placed less emphasis
than they once had on direct analysis of the merits of order maintenance as
a use of police resources and authority--on questions about whether the
maintenance of public order is a legitimate goal for policing and whether
the strategies police use to pursue it are justifiable. Arguments claiming
that order maintenance deserves greater emphasis in policing predate the
broken windows theory,23 and for a time in the 1970s and 1980s, policing
scholars debated those arguments by focusing directly on the merits of
"public order" as a goal of policing (rather than the contribution that public
20 Benjamin Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder, Zero Tolerance or
Crack's Decline?, 39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 531 (1999); John Eck & Edward Maguire, Have
Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME
DROP IN AMERICA 207 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000); Jeffrey Fagan et aL.,
Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1277 (1998); Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and
Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELNQ. 171 (1999). But see Kelling & Sousa,
supra note 16.
21 Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 18, at 638.
22 E.g., HARCOURT, supra note 17; Katz et al., supra note 3; Lo'c Wacquant, Scrutinizing
the Street: Poverty, Morality, and the Pitfalls of Urban Ethnography, 107 Am. J. SOC. 1468
(2002).
23 E.g., WILSON, supra note 5; Kelling, Conclusions, supra note 6.
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order made to crime reduction).24 This debate, in turn, drew on a rich
empirical, historical, and conceptual literature about the order maintenance
function.25  After the "Broken Windows" article appeared, however,
scholarly attention largely turned to questions about, the effect of order
maintenance on crime, rather than the intrinsic merits of public order as a
goal of policing. By 1986, Gary Sykes had already raised concerns about
this trend in an article that foreshadowed Rein and Winship's arguments
about the dangers of strong causal reasoning. "[T]he primary justification
for the revival of peacekeeping strategies rests essentially on police
effectiveness in crime control [i.e., via the broken windows theory]," Sykes
noted.2 6 "By salvaging the crime control function via order maintenance,
the moral arguments in support of peacekeeping are not explored.
2 7
As Rein and Winship acknowledge, 28 debates about the sort of "moral
arguments" whose absence Sykes lamented are usually difficult to resolve,
so the possibility that social science might offer a way to avoid them-that
it might be able to replace contentious normative questions with causal
questions resolvable using objective methods-is an attractive idea. For
that reason, it is not surprising that policing scholars turned their attention
to the more scientific enterprise of testing the broken windows hypothesis
once it emerged as a possible rationale for order maintenance policies. If
order maintenance has major effects on crime, the contentious and
seemingly intractable question of whether "public order" is an intrinsically
appropriate goal for policing could safely be set aside. Nevertheless, two
difficulties confront this attempt to bypass Sykes's "moral arguments"
about order maintenance policing.
First, it is not clear that the broken windows thesis could justify
intervention against disorder on its own even if it were true. The broken
windows theory claims to identify clear harms caused by disorder that
24 E.g., HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY (1977); CARL KLOCKARS,
THINKING ABOUT POLICE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS (1983); Kelling, Acquiring a Taste for
Order, supra note 6; Carl Klockars, Street Justice: Some Micro-Moral Reservations.
Comment on Sykes, 3 JUST. Q. 513 (1986) [hereinafter Klockars, Street Justice]; Sykes,
supra note 6; Walker, supra note 6.
25 See sources in note 5. "Broken Windows" itself emerged out of this earlier literature.
On Kelling's account, the article arose out of an earlier evaluation of foot patrol activities in
Newark, which he had overseen for the Police Foundation and which focused partly on the
order maintenance function. After reading the description of order maintenance activities in
the evaluation, Wilson contacted Kelling to discuss the broken windows idea. GEORGE L.
KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND
REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 319 (1996).
26 Sykes, supra note 6, at 501.
27 Id. at 501-02.
28 Rein & Winship, supra note 4, at 39.
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would justify criminal justice intervention. As Bernard Harcourt puts it,
"[w]hat the theory accomplished was to transform these quality-of-life
offenses from mere nuisances or annoyances into seriously harmful
conduct-conduct that in fact contributes to serious crimes," thereby
identifying a clear-cut moral basis for police intervention.2 9 But if disorder
causes crime in the way the broken windows thesis indicates, it does so
through the voluntary actions of third parties. For example, a panhandler's
disorderly behavior sends a signal to a hardened criminal that a
neighborhood is out-of-control and thus ripe for predation. But in cases of
this kind-where A's actions unintentionally cause B to harm C-it is
rarely appropriate to view A's actions as wrongful purely because of the
harm to C.30 The issues are not identical, but it is suggestive to compare the
case of media violence, where a moviemaker's (A's) actions arguably
induce criminals (B) to harm their victims (C). It is hard to imagine a case
where it would be appropriate to hold a moviemaker criminally liable for
producing a film that planted the idea for a crime in a criminal's head, and
for that reason legal scholar Joel Feinberg has concluded that "legislatures
... should be leery of passing criminal legislation against the 'indirect
causation' of harm through film broadcasts., 31 In a similar way, it is hard
to imagine a case where otherwise-innocuous disorder would justify
criminal justice intervention because it inspired serious crime by an
32independent party. If disorder has large effects on crime, that may be a
29 HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 207.
30 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 232-43; H.L.A. HART & A. M. HONORt,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 129-51 (1959).
31 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 239. One important difference between
the case at hand and the moviemaking case is that the social value of even innocuous
disorder is often much less significant than the social value of free artistic expression. But
the two cases are formally similar because both involve "prima facie innocent conduct"
(insofar as broken windows purports to justify the criminalization of disorder that would
otherwise be permitted) that is "a 'but-for cause' of the commission of a seriously harmful
crime by independent parties" (i.e., the crime would not have happened "but for" the
innocent conduct). See id. at 232, 239-40.
32 HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 208 cites Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903
F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) as a case in which a court relied on "broken windows" to justify an
order maintenance ordinance (in this case an anti-begging ordinance in the subway). But in
its opinion, the court did not rely on arguments about the indirect effects of disorder; instead
it focused on the kinds of immediate harms and offenses discussed below, writing,
[Subway] passengers perceive begging and panhandling to be "intimidating," "threatening," and
"harassing." The conduct often involves "unwanted touching [and] detaining" of passengers.
The police have great difficulty distinguishing between "panhandling and extortion." Begging is
"inherently aggressive" to the "captive" passengers in the close confines of the subway
atmosphere. Based on these facts, it is fair to say that whether intended as so, or not, begging in
the subway often amounts to nothing less than assault, creating in the passengers the
apprehension of imminent danger. Additionally, begging in the subway raises legitimate
[Vol. 94
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good reason to try to prevent it in other ways, and it may be a good reason
for police to make disorder a larger priority if there are already other
reasons to justify regulating it. But the effects of disorder on crime may not
be a strong reason to criminalize otherwise-innocuous disorder on its own,
so we cannot bypass Sykes's question so easily.
The second difficulty, more salient for the present discussion of the
dangers of strong causal reasoning, is that scientific theories often prove
less powerful than originally hoped, so policy interventions can rarely be
justified substantially by their indirect effects. Rein and Winship explain:
[S]ocial science has been able to provide only what we would call "weak" causal
theories. In the vast majority of cases the effects that are found are of modest size and
only a small amount of the variation in the dependent variable is explained .... What
is problematic is that in arguing for particular policies we often argue as if social
science's findings imply that there are strong determinative relations between
particular causes and outcomes. Certainly, education affects earnings, but this does
not mean that equalizing education will have much effect on earnings inequality.
Similarly, economic poverty certainly affects child development, but this does not
mean that reducing economic poverty will substantially improve child development.
33
In the same way, disorder may affect crime, but that does not mean order
maintenance will substantially reduce the level of violence in the most
troubled cities and neighborhoods-a conclusion that seems to be borne out
by recent disillusionment with the broken windows theory among many
criminologists. Consequently, it is probably too optimistic to hope that the
strong causal broken windows theory offers a scientific way to bypass
difficult moral arguments about the propriety of "public order" as a goal of
policing.
In cases like school desegregation and order maintenance policing,
when dramatic claims about the indirect effects of an intervention fail to
materialize, we should return, as Rein and Winship suggest, 4 to the direct
effects and intrinsic features of the policy and ask whether those effects and
intrinsic features are desirable. Is desegregation morally justified, whatever
its indirect effects on black childrens' achievement? Is order maintenance a
worthwhile and legitimate police activity, even if its indirect effects on
serious crime are not large? Rein and Winship's analysis indicates clearly
why these questions are important and indeed unavoidable, but it offers less
concerns about public safety. The conduct "disrupts" and "startles" passengers, thus creating the
potential for a serious accident in the fast-moving and crowded subway environment. In short,
the . . . judgment that begging is alarmingly harmful conduct that simply cannot be
accommodated in the subway system is not unreasonable.
Young, 903 F.2d at 158. Broken Windows' indirect causation plays no role in this analysis.
33 Rein & Winship, supra note 4, at 40-41.
14 Id. at 45.
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guidance in suggesting how we should go about answering them. In the
next section I develop one possibility by drawing on recent ideas about
ethical inquiry.
II. ORDER MAINTENANCE RECONSIDERED
Any claim that order maintenance is intrinsically appropriate, or that
the production of "public order" is a legitimate goal for policing, may strike
many social scientists as a mere assertion that cannot be subjected to
scholarly analysis. In this section I will discuss how scholarly analysis can
help to evaluate such claims. To evaluate claims about the intrinsic merits
of a policy, it is necessary to have a clear view of both facts (about what
exactly the policy entails in different contexts) and values (about which
ideals the policy implicates in each of these contexts). To evaluate this
particular claim about order maintenance policing, it is essential to develop
a detailed, contextualized picture of what "order maintenance" activities
involve-what exactly "disorder" means in practice and what steps police
take to reduce it-and to identify and analyze the values that they implicate
by drawing on and refining concepts from moral and political philosophy. I
first explain the need for ethnographic research in these analyses, arguing
that the lack of attention to this kind of research has hindered those few
attempts that have been made to examine the intrinsic merits of order
maintenance activities. I then explain the need for engagement with moral
and political philosophy, arguing that familiar liberal theories about the
scope and limits of state action offer a useful framework to assess order
maintenance policing. In making these arguments, I will of necessity return
several times with a critical, but hopefully constructive eye to the small
number of recent studies that have considered the intrinsic merits of order
maintenance policing.35
EMPIRICAL INQUIRY AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Questions about the intrinsic merits of an action are often viewed as
purely normative matters, so my statement that empirical study plays a role
in these assessments needs explanation. The essential point is that ethical
analysis can rarely offer general judgments about a category of actions
because whether or not some action is appropriate depends heavily on
36context. For example, the most sophisticated practical ethicists do not ask
whether the general category of acts called "lies" is right or wrong in the
abstract; instead they identify and consider specific examples of lying in
35 E.g., HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 127-248.
36 ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN ToULMiN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1988).
[Vol. 94
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particular contexts in order to develop a taxonomy of cases that maps out
examples of inappropriate and acceptable lies.37 In part, this attention to
context is necessary because general maxims (like "do not lie") are
invariably ambiguous-particularly in marginal situations where key termis
are ambiguous (as in cases where it is unclear whether a statement is a lie)
or where one maxim conflicts with others (as in cases where the duty not to
lie conflicts with the duty to minimize suffering).38 In part, it is necessary
because our normative judgments are often most certain when they refer to
situations that are specific, concrete, and real; 39 we simply do not know
whether abstract maxims like "do not lie" are valid ethical principles
because we cannot adequately imagine the many situations to which they
apply. Because context shapes ethical judgment in these ways, the first step
in moral analysis is a kind of thick description of activities in their
context.40  As Joel Feinberg argued in his seminal treatise on the moral
limits of the criminal law, "there is a limit to the power of abstract
reasoning to settle questions of moral legitimacy;" when considering such
questions, it is essential to consider the actions at issue in concrete detaill.
4
From this perspective, one of the most serious gaps in contemporary
scholarship about order maintenance policing is the dearth of research that
investigates what exactly order maintenance policing activities involve-
what behaviors they target in which contexts, and what actions police take
to control them. Since Kelling's brief descriptions of the order maintenance
activities he observed while walking the beat with Newark foot patrol
officers in the late 1970s,4 2 I am aware of no ethnographic research in
criminology that systematically describes what officers engaged in order
maintenance policing do, or what kinds of "disorder" they target. In that
sense, the thick description that practical ethics should begin with has been
neglected in recent police scholarship, making it impossible to thoroughly
analyze the intrinsic propriety of order maintenance activities.
37 E.g., SISELA BOK, LYING (1978). For a similar approach in just war theory, see
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS (1978) [hereinafter WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS]; Michael Walzer,
World War II: Why Was This War Different?, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1971).
31 JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 36.
39 ROBERT GOODIN, POLITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (1982); HENRY
RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 13 8 (1994).
40 BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE MATTER: WHY SOCIAL INQUIRY FAILS AND
How IT CAN SUCCEED AGAIN (2001); MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL
CRITICISM (1987); Barry Hoffmaster, Can Ethnography Save the Life of Medical Ethics?, 35
Soc. SCI. & MED. 1421 (1992).
"1 FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 10.
42 Kelling, Conclusions, supra note 6; cfBittner, supra note 5; Wilson, supra note 5.
2004]
DA VID THACHER
Criminologists have rushed over the question of what order maintenance
policing is, relying instead on rudimentary proxies for it in order to analyze
what it causes. As a result of this gap in empirical research, much of the
literature about order maintenance policing has a stylized view of what it
involves-both how police maintain order, and what they treat as
disorderly. Consider each of these issues in turn.
How Do Police Maintain Order? First, much of the order
maintenance literature has not probed deeply into the question of what steps
police might and do take to maintain order, so scholars have relied on a
stylized view of order maintenance practice that does not offer an adequate
basis for a valid assessment of this policing strategy. For example, Bernard
Harcourt, a prominent critic of order maintenance policing, regularly
equates order maintenance activity with arrests for minor offenses,
describing it as a strategy that emphasizes "arresting misdemeanor and
public order offenders-rather than issuing warnings or implementing
alternative problem-solving techniques. ' 3 Similarly, other scholars equate
order maintenance policing with "zero tolerance," i.e., a firm policy that
even minor violations will result in arrest.44 Although it is possible that
such blunt approaches to order maintenance exist in some cities at some
times, it is unlikely that this stylized description of order maintenance
tactics fairly captures the range of possibilities that this policing strategy
potentially offers. Consequently, it does not offer a sufficiently nuanced
image of "order maintenance policing" to support a sophisticated
assessment of that practice. Again, it is impossible to flesh out the nuanced
picture of order maintenance practice that would be needed in the absence
of more ethnographic study than recent literature has produced, but the few
glimpses of practice that are available-primarily prescriptive statements
about order maintenance policing from its practitioners-are suggestive.
Consider the New Haven Police Department's "Order Maintenance
Training Bulletin," which instructs officers to "use the least forceful means
possible to achieve its purposes."
The first level of intervention, whether by managers, supervisors, or by police
officers, will be to educate the public about civility, the consequences of incivility,
and the laws that oblige citizens to behave in particular ways. This can be done in
neighborhood meetings, in schools, or in interactions with citizens. Some citizens do
not fully understand their obligations, and if those obligations-for example,
regarding a noisy car or public drinking in parks-are patiently explained, they will
adhere to the law. The second level of intervention will be to remind citizens of their
responsibilities if they are disorderly-that is, that they are breaking the law and
43 Bernard Harcourt, Policing Disorder, 27 BOSTON REv. 2, 20 (2002); cf. HARCOURT,
supra note 17, at 48-49, 149.
44 E.g., Greene, supra note 20.
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subject to penalties if they persist. This too can be done in a variety of ways. It could
be done by visiting a problem location and warning people that if their behavior
continues they will be subject to penalties. Similarly, owners of locations that are
chronic problems could be so warned by individual officers. The final level of
intervention will be law enforcement-the use of citation and arrest.
45
This account directly contradicts Harcourt's description of order
maintenance practice, and other prescriptive statements about order
maintenance policing have echoed it. For example, Kelling and Coles
advised prospective order maintenance practitioners that "depending upon
his or her assessment of the situation, an officer will have to decide to
educate the offender, refer him or her to an agency for help, give a warning,
order the offender to move on, cite him or her, make an arrest, or take some
other action. 46 In the absence of ethnographic study, it remains an open
question whether policing practice often realizes this nuanced ideal, but
simply equating order maintenance policing with misdemeanor arrests is
clearly too simple. The crucial point is that there exist possible approaches
to order maintenance more subtle than "zero tolerance." An analysis of
order maintenance policing that ignores them is akin to an analysis of lying
that only examines, say, self-serving lies.
47
Such simplifications make it impossible to offer a clear normative
analysis of the intrinsic merits of order maintenance tactics. Consider
Harcourt's analysis of order maintenance policing, which aims to shed light
on order maintenance policing's intrinsic merits-or rather, its intrinsic
dangers-by analyzing the role it plays in the carceral network to which
Michel Foucault called our attention . In the process, however, his
equation of order maintenance with misdemeanor arrests leads him astray:
To say ... that broken windows policing is part of the disciplinary project is to say
too little; everything is today, since we live, according to Foucault, in a disciplinary
society .... What we have to do today is compare the different genres of discipline.
It is here that we can refine Foucault's analysis, for there are many things that order
maintenance is not. It is not modeled on the rehabilitative ideal central to many
disciplinary projects .... It does not feed into the psychotherapeutic. It does not
coddle the disorderly. It does not aim to reform the disorderly so much as it does to
punish them and to exclude them, in the sense of getting them off the street.
49
"' GEORGE KELLING, "BROKEN WINDOWS" AND POLICE DISCRETION 50 (1999)
[hereinafter KELLING, BROKEN WINDOWS].
46 KELLING & COLES, supra note 25, at 188-89.
47 Cf BOK, supra, note 37; JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 36; WALZER, JUST AND
UNJUST WARS, supra note 37.
48 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977).
49 HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 149.
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If there is any descriptive truth to Kelling and Coles' prescriptive account
of order maintenance policing, or to New Haven's order maintenance
policy, then this interpretation is too quick. On Kelling and Coles' account,
and under New Haven's policy, police do try to "reform" the disorderly-to
help define and inculcate the norms of order that they must abide by. Thus
it is impossible to identify the meaning of order maintenance policing
accurately-to locate it within Foucault's analysis of the disciplinary
project, or even to determine whether that analysis is relevant to it-without
a more detailed account of what it involves. Foucault himself, the most
prominent contemporary exponent of Nietzsche's genealogical method
(which views historical and empirical study as a prerequisite for
philosophical analysis), would insist on this empirical dimension to
normative analysis.
50
What Do Police Treat as Disorderly? In the same way that it relies on
a stylized view of the techniques police use to control disorder,
contemporary scholarship often relies on a stylized view about the activities
that constitute "disorder," using broadly-defined behaviors like "loitering,"
"panhandling," "public drinking," and "public urination." To appreciate the
limits of this approach, consider four specific examples of the way police
departments and order maintenance practitioners have defined disorder. All
of these examples come from Kelling's writings because he has been one of
the few scholars to offer anything that approaches the detailed account of
order maintenance practice that is needed.
"Obstructing" in the New York Subway. When the New York City
Metropolitan Transit Authority developed its order maintenance initiative, it
spent substantial time refining the regulations that transit police would
enforce. Kelling and Coles offer one example:
One rule, against "obstructing" was especially troublesome. It was sufficiently vague
both to invite legal challenges, and to trouble line officers charged with enforcing it.
Was a person lying halfway across a walkway that was otherwise unimpeded
obstructing? How about a person who stopped at the bottom of stairs, just to get
oriented? What about someone who set luggage on the platform, inadvertently
blocking free movement? Was the person obstructing and therefore deserving police
attention? Police were nervous that too much discretion was involved in answering
these and a myriad of other questions about obstructing. As the group took
photographs and videos of actual subway conditions and played out enforcement
50 Bent Flyvbjerg, Aristotle, Foucault, and Progressive Phronesis, in APPLIED ETHICS: A
READER 11-27 (Earl Winkler & Jerrold Coombs eds., 1993); cf FLYVBJERG, supra note 40;




scenarios, members realized that the problem was not really obstructing, but lying
down.
5 1
Thus the broad concept of "obstructing" came to be replaced by the more
concrete behavior of "lying down."
"Youth Parties" in Dayton. In Dayton, Ohio, police repeatedly
received complaints about student parties, which created tensions between
students and nearby residents. The department did not define all parties and
late-night activity as "disorder" that would not be tolerated. Instead it
consulted with students and residents to develop guidelines that regulated
such activity and revisited them for reconsideration each year. For
example, the guidelines discussed the traffic problems student parties
created as follows:
The residents recognize that large numbers of students in attendance at parties may
require the temporary use of the streets. It is important, however, that vehicles be
permitted to pass through these crowds so that residents can gain access to their
property and so emergency vehicles can pass. Police crews are expected to ensure
vehicles are not being blocked unless barricades have been erected in accordance with
our block party procedures.
52
"Public Urination" in New Haven. When the New Haven Police
Department considered the issue of public urination in its order
maintenance training bulletin, it did not define all cases of "public
urination" as disorderly. Instead it delimited the contexts where police
should target public urination by informing officers that "we would be less
concerned about a person who urinated publicly if the person attempted to
find a solitary location and maintain a sense of modesty than someone who
flagrantly exposed him or herself in a highly visible location.,
53
Panhandling. The most controversial aspect of order maintenance
policing has been its focus on panhandling. Kelling has advised police
departments to oppose outright bans on panhandling, writing "because
some beggars are no threat to anyone, it seems appropriate to limit
legislation and police action to aggressive panhandling." Elaborating on
that distinction, he explains that it requires detailed attention to context:
Identical behavior can be passive or aggressive, depending upon its context. At least
five contextual elements give meaning to behavior: time, location, number or
aggregation of events, condition of the victim/observer relative to the
perpetrator/actor, and the previous behavior/reputation of the perpetrator/actor. A
person standing at the top of subway stairs, holding a paper cup, and begging during
the 8 a.m. rush hour is not much of a threat. At 10 p.m., the same panhandler,
5' KELLING & COLES, supra note 25, at 123.
52 KELLING, BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 45, at 30.
13 Id. at 51.
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behaving in the same manner as observed during the rush hour, is a genuine threat to a
solitary elderly woman returning home from work. The time and the location and
condition of the woman combine to turn the beggar's behavior into a threat that
anyone in the woman's position would feel.
54
Whether any of these specific cases or categories of actions justify police
attention may remain controversial. The point is just that our judgments
about these specific cases and categories may be different from-and
ultimately more reliable and fine-grained than-our judgments about the
general categories commonly used in the literature. For that reason,
attempts to determine whether "public order" is a legitimate goal of
policing are premature without greater empirical detail. Definitions of
"disorder" that rely on broad categories like "obstructing," "youth parties,"
"public urination," and "panhandling" need to be replaced with a more
context-specific definition of disorder-a definition that relies on more
specific categories like "lying down on public steps," "flagrant public
urination in a highly visible location," and "parties that persistently block
vehicular access to streets," as well as particular cases like the beggar who
approaches a solitary elderly woman in the dark to panhandle.
Ethnographic observation is the most effective way to develop this kind of a
nuanced picture of disorder.
Once again, inattention to these empirical subtleties undermines those
few efforts that have been made to assess the intrinsic merits of "public
order" as a goal for policing. Consider the following passage from
Harcourt:
What exactly does disorder mean? What does it communicate? Proponents of the
broken windows theory assume that it means a neighborhood has lost control and
doesn't care about crime. But surely there are other plausible meanings. It could
signal artistic ferment, a youth hangout, rebellion, or an alternative lifestyle. It could
communicate frenzied commercial activity, a frantic pace of life, or a bullish stock
market.
55
In this passage, Harcourt implies that "disorder" may be interpreted in a
more positive way than the proponents of order maintenance policing have
interpreted it-that disorder signifies positive social values like "artistic
ferment" and healthy "rebellion," so efforts to suppress it are often
misguided.56 In particular, he argues that we only view disorder as
threatening because the broken windows theory has taught us to do so; there
is no intrinsic reason to view disorder as undesirable." Is this alternative
14 Id. at 33-35.
55 HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 132.
56 Cf. RICHARD SENNETr, THE USES OF DISORDER (1992).
57 HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 127-84.
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interpretation of "disorder" plausible? To the extent that police define
"disorder" the way the departments summarized in the previous paragraph
intended to define it, it is not. It is very hard to argue that lying down on a
public stairway generally signifies any healthy form of political rebellion or
artistic ferment, that young partygoers who refuse to make room for
vehicles to pass a public street signify a desirable or even tolerable kind of
youth hangout, and that flagrant public urination in highly visible areas
signifies an alternative lifestyle in any positive sense. On the other hand, in
cities or neighborhoods where police do indiscriminately prohibit all forms
of "panhandling," "youth parties," or even "public urination," critiques like
Harcourt's are more plausible. In those cases, order maintenance activity
may unjustly suppress innocuous and even valuable activity.
Efforts to defend (rather than criticize) order maintenance policing
have sometimes suffered from the same inattention to the empirical
complexity of disorder. In the 1986 article mentioned above, Gary Sykes
mounted a general moral defense of order maintenance policing on the
grounds that disorder (which he defines roughly as "violations of
community norms") undermines community life.58 But as Carl Klockars
noted at the time, any general defense of this kind will inevitably overreach.
Sykes's defense, Klockars argued:
suffers from being so abstract and general that it is not very helpful in distinguishing
types of order maintenance policing which are good and should be encouraged from
those which are bad and should not. Sykes leaves us with a thesis that says all order
maintenance policing is a good thing; and that, I believe Sykes would agree, is just not
true.
59
It is just as problematic to imply that police should be empowered prohibit
all instances of "panhandling," "loitering," and even "public urination" as it
is to imply that they should have no power to regulate behavior that falls
into these categories. Any viable attempt to defend order maintenance
activity needs to draw careful and complex distinctions among kinds of
public behavior.
For these reasons, to evaluate whether order maintenance efforts are
appropriate, and to distinguish "types of order maintenance policing which
are good and should be encouraged from those which are bad and should
not," we need a detailed picture of what police might potentially treat as
disorderly in practice to serve as a basis for considered judgments as to
which of those situations justify police intervention. This picture must be
constructed through ethnographic observation of the conditions of social
58 Sykes, supra note 6, at 497.
59 Klockars, Street Justice, supra note 24, at 513.
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life that police encounter in troubled neighborhoods. Just as we cannot say
in the abstract whether "lying" is right or wrong, we cannot say in the
abstract whether "disorder" should be prohibited. What we can say with
greater confidence is whether particular kinds of behavior, described in the
context where they occur, are a legitimate focus for police attention. We
can confidently pass judgment on police who arrest a single panhandler
who politely asks passersby in a busy commercial district for spare change,
and we can confidently make the opposite judgment about police who
ignore a man who flagrantly urinates in public on a neighborhood street
traversed by families on their evening walk home. With more difficulty and
less certainty, we can consider the many kinds of complicated cases that
police encounter between these two extremes, asking whether and how they
resemble the paradigm cases just described--on the one hand, cases of
behavior that clearly should be permitted, and on the other hand, cases of
behavior that clearly call for police attention.6 ° The effort to describe and
analyze such cases would begin with ethnographic accounts of how police
carry out their peacekeeping function in practice, focusing on the kinds of
situations police might potentially treat as disorderly and the steps they take
when they do intervene. That effort would help to draw the line, one case at
a time, between behavior and conditions that are innocuous and those that
are intolerable-to draw a line around the normative concept of "disorder"
that defines a particular kind of legitimate focus for police attention. In
Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin's terms, this effort would generate a
moral taxonomy of order and disorder.6'
THE ROLE OF MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
Practical judgment about particular cases can often take us a long way,
since judgments about concrete situations are often relatively firm. But
particularly when controversial cases are at issue (such as those between the
two extreme cases in the previous paragraph), it is useful to check these
concrete judgments against more general moral principles. 6' To paraphrase
60 1 describe this kind of analysis in more detail in David Thacher, The Casuistical Turn
in Planning Ethics: Lessons from Law and Medicine, 23 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 269 (2004).
61 JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 36.
62 In the previous paragraph I suggested a less principle-driven alternative for analyzing
these hard cases: That the cases should be analyzed using the methods of analogical
reasoning, which aim to determine whether a hard case resembles a clear case of disorder
that warrants police attention or a clear case of innocuous behavior that does not. Analogical
reasoning of this kind is an important tool in ethical analyses of hard cases. See JONSEN &
TOULMIN, supra note 36. In the final analysis, however, it cannot avoid engagement with
more general principles altogether. We conclude that two cases are different (or similar)for
a reason, even if that reason is not theoretically ambitious or given in advance. See CASS
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Nelson Goodman,63 moral principles and concrete judgments are justified
by being brought into agreement with each other. General principles are
amended if they yield a concrete judgment that we are unwilling to accept
(e.g., the general principle that "disorder is a sign of artistic ferment" may
need to be modified if we are unwilling to accept the inference that
"flagrant public urination on a neighborhood street is a sign of artistic
ferment"). But concrete judgments may also be rejected if they violate
general principles we are unwilling to amend (e.g., the initial judgment that
police should cite someone who urinates in public even if he does so
"modestly" and in a side alley may need to be rejected by those who accept
the analysis of homelessness and freedom presented below). That, at least,
is the basic insight behind John Rawls's influential account of ethical
reasoning as the pursuit of "reflective equilibrium," which drew explicitly
on Goodman's account. 64
In keeping with this view about ethical reasoning, analyses of order
maintenance policing's intrinsic merits should draw from the abstractions
provided by normative theory as well as the concrete images provided by
ethnographic research. Where the latter offers concrete cases about which
we can make tentative judgments, the former offers general principles with
which those judgments can be compared. The pursuit of reflective
equilibrium involves the encounter between these two features of our
ethical commitments, in which we ask whether we have reasons to modify
any of our existing beliefs. We use the concrete judgments to ask whether
general principles are adequate, and we use the general principles to ask
whether our concrete judgments should be overturned.
In the study of order maintenance policing, scholars have proposed
various normative theories as starting points for this kind of analysis. In
this section, I will briefly review two of those theories, and I will then argue
that conventional liberal ideals (those that define individual rights and limit
the goals that criminal justice may legitimately pursue with reference to
conventional principles of philosophical liberalism) offer a better
framework for analyzing the moral basis of order maintenance.
Foucauldian Political Theory. Among critics of order maintenance
policing, the most sustained attempt to use normative theory to assess the
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 65 (1996). 1 have discussed this
issue at greater length in Thacher, supra note 60.
63 NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 64 (1954).
64 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-21, 48-51 (1971); cf RiCHARDSON, supra note
39; John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REv. 177 (1951); John
Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, in COLLECTED PAPERS (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999); David Thacher, Value Rationality in Policy Analysis (2003) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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intrinsic merits of order maintenance policing again comes from Harcourt,
who offers an argument against order maintenance policing that draws on
the philosophy of Michel Foucault. I have already argued that Harcourt has
not offered an adequate empirical background to support that analysis.
Nevertheless, it is possible that more thorough empirical study would not
contradict his overall argument (indeed, I am inclined to think such study
would actually reveal more of Foucault's core techniques of disciplinary
power), so it is worth examining it in more detail.
Harcourt's argument is complex, but one important strand draws on
Foucault's idea of "subject creation" to argue that order maintenance
policing introduces an arbitrary dichotomy between "the orderly" and "the
disorderly." In making this argument, Harcourt suggests that our current
understanding of orderliness (and our preference for order over disorder) is
socially constructed, and for that reason we should question its wisdom.65
This analysis does not, however, have the normative force that Harcourt
implies for it. The possibility that our ideas about "disorder" might be
otherwise is not yet an argument that they should be.66 The fact that current
conceptions of order and disorder "may be constructed, may change, may
be changed ' 67 does not tell us whether those conceptions are justifiable, and
the observation that these socially-constructed conceptions make efforts to
police disorder "seem natural, necessary, preordained, 68 does not tell us
whether those efforts are appropriate. Ronald Dworkin's words in a
different context are an apt response to Harcourt's challenge: "We can do
no more ... in the face of that caution, than to think again with that
possibility in mind. The prospect of future change ...should no doubt
make us more tentative and thoughtful. But it cannot count, in itself, as any
,169argument against our present opinions.
In the end, the question is not whether these natural-seeming ideas are
socially constructed but whether we have good reasons to revise them. For
example, for those who hold them, is there any reason to question the
beliefs that police should intervene when someone flagrantly urinates in
public, when student partiers block traffic and refuse to move, or when a
panhandler approaches an elderly woman exiting the subway at night?
Though Harcourt's analysis of the Foucauldian concept of subject creation
65 HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 127-84.
66 Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
113 (1996).
67 HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 134.
68 Id. at 158.




is creative and thorough, I cannot see how it identifies justifiable normative
principles that would call our intuitive judgments about these cases into
question. Moreover, this gap does not result from the way Harcourt uses
Foucault's philosophy; it is an inherent weakness of that philosophy.
Foucault's analysis, although empirically rich in its descriptions of the
techniques of modem power, lacks normative principles that can help to
assess those techniques in cases where our intuitions about them are
conflicted. Nancy Fraser expressed this view succinctly in an influential
article:
Because he has no basis for distinguishing, for example, forms of power which
involve domination from those which do not, Foucault appears to endorse a one-sided,
wholesale rejection of modernity as such. Furthermore, he appears to do so without
any conception of what is to replace it .... Clearly what Foucault needs and needs
desperately are normative criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable
forms of power.
70
In sum, Foucauldian genealogy can be an important aspect of ethical
analysis, but it only offers the empirical component discussed in the last
section, not the normative principles needed to complement it.
Comm unitarianism. Among order maintenance proponents, many
scholars have drawn on communitarianism to justify police efforts to
eliminate disorder. On this view, police derive the authority to maintain
order from "community traditions" 7' or "community norms,, 7 2 which
establish the standards of orderly conduct that police enforce. Police can
legitimately enforce these norms, even at some cost to individual freedom
as that notion is conventionally understood because a vibrant and orderly
community life is a, prerequisite of true individual freedom and
flourishing-because "no one is truly autonomous, [because] liberty can
only exist in an environment of reasonable order, and [because] personal
development requires familial and neighborhood support," as James Q.
Wilson put it.73  It is unreasonable to criticize order maintenance for
infringing on personal liberty because liberty loses its value without a
stable, orderly, supportive community environment in which to exercise it.
Thus, Gary Sykes argued that:
[I]n responding to the mandate for order maintenance, the police create a sense of
community that makes social life possible. Where police are unwilling or unable to
70 Nancy Fraser, Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative
Confusions, I PRAXIS INT'L 272, 286 (1981); cf JORGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCOURSE ON MODERNITY (1990).
7' Kelling, Acquiring a Taste for Order, supra note 6, at 96.
72 Sykes, supra note 6, at 497.
73 James Q. Wilson, Foreword to KELLING & COLES, supra note 25, at xiii.
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play this moral leadership role or define the community boundaries of right conduct,
the quality of life declines and the existence of every other cherished value may be
jeopardized.
7 4
It has always been objected that this perspective grants police too
much power to regulate public behavior, since some community norms
should not be supported.7 ' Even many communitarians have recognized
that "neighborhoods empowered to impose their values upon individual
behavior and expression can be both coercive and cruel, 7 6 so a principle
holding that police may intervene in any situation that the community
defines as disorderly is unacceptable because it grants police too much
power. The hard work lies in defining the limits of that principle-the
limits beyond which the will of the community cannot justify police
intervention.
Whether communitarianism can define those limits on its own is a
matter of considerable controversy, 7 and I do not intend to engage in that
dispute here because I think it is premature to do so. Scholars who rely on
communitarian ideals to justify order maintenance policing often do so
because they assume that liberalism cannot accomplish this task on its own.
Thus, James Q. Wilson believes that liberalism's "rights-oriented legal
tradition does not easily deal with" the problem of public disorder, 8 and
this belief apparently leads him to turn to communitarian ideals to justify
order maintenance. To the extent that order maintenance is consistent with
existing liberal ideals, there is no need to turn to the controversial tenets of
communitarianism to defend it.
Liberalism. Skepticism about liberalism's ability to justify criminal
justice intervention against disorder seems to rest on a misunderstanding of
the harm principle that underlies the liberal theory of criminal justice-the
principle that no action can be prohibited by criminal law unless it causes
harm to others.7 9  The skeptics worry that any individual incident of
disorder will not be viewed as "harmful," or that its harm will be viewed as
trivial (which is just as bad, since the harm principle comes with the
corollary that the law does not concern itself with trifles).8 ° For example, in
71 Sykes, supra note 6, at 505.
75 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1978); Klockars, Street Justice, supra note 24, at
514; David Thacher, Equity and Community Policing, 20 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5 (2001).
76 PETER BERGER & RICHARD NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE 68 (1996); cf Kelling,
Acquiring a Taste for Order, supra note 6, at 101.
7 See, e.g., Philip Selznick, Social Justice: A Communitarian Perspective, in THE
ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1996).
78 Wilson, supra note 73, at xv.
79 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2; MILL, supra note 75.
80 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 188-90.
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concluding that liberalism's rights-oriented legal tradition "does not easily
deal with" the problem of disorder, Wilson emphasizes the way it focuses
narrowly on individuals:
The court will, typically, hear a case brought by (or on behalf of) an individual
beggar, sleeper, or solicitor. Such an individual rarely constitutes much of a threat to
anyone, and so the claims of communal order often seem, in the particular case, to be
suspect or overdrawn. But the effects on a community of many individuals taking
advantage of the rights granted to an individual ... are often qualitatively different
from the effects of a single person .... The judge finds it hard to believe that one
broken window is all that important .... 81
Wilson is clearly right to conclude that this situation is more challenging to
liberal ideals than more conventional criminal offenses like burglary or
assault. But liberal theory does not utterly lack conceptual resources to deal
with this kind of situation because it does not restrict the reach of criminal
justice only to those acts that cause significant harms on their own. First,
an act that does not cause dramatic harm in isolation may still justify
criminal justice intervention if it qualifies as an accumulative harm.8
2
Second, a harmless act may still justify criminal justice intervention if it
qualifies as an offense to others. With the aid of these concepts, liberalism
has less difficulty than Wilson suggests in justifying police intervention
against disorderly conduct that intuitively seems to call for it, and it offers
useful principles to aid intuition in more complicated cases.
Consider accumulative harms first, since they speak directly to the
worry Wilson expressed above. Accumulative harms are actions that do not
cause significant harm in isolation but do harm some public interest (such
as the viability of a neighborhood or a street comer) once a threshold has
been crossed. Familiar examples include littering (dropping a single candy
wrapper on the sidewalk will not spoil the streetscape but dropping many
will) and air pollution (one car's emissions will have a negligible effect on
air quality but the emissions of many cars may cause unsafe concentrations
of pollutants). It is true that each instance of an accumulative harm is trivial
in isolation, but as the instances accumulate, they eventually pass the
threshold from inconvenience to harm. For reasons of fairness and
practicality, it rarely makes sense to criminalize only the act that crosses
that threshold-to prosecute the last straw, but not those that set the stage
for it. The alternatives are to prohibit all instances of the accumulative
harm (which is how we deal with littering) or to set up a system of
regulation that controls the amount of harm that will accumulate, backing
81 Wilson, supra note 73, at xiv-xv.
82 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 225-32.
83 See FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 2.
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up that regulatory system with criminal sanctions (which is how we deal
with air pollution). The regulatory approach is especially appropriate when
the relevant behavior has great value to society or those who perform it (as
in the case of driving a car but not the case of dropping a candy wrapper on
the sidewalk), since regulation makes it possible to allow some room for
valuable activities while keeping their cumulative effects in check.
84
Many instances of disorder can be viewed in this way, and they present
neither more nor less difficult challenges for liberal theories of criminal
justice than littering and pollution. Consider the case of "lying down" in
the subway station from the previous section. It may be true that a single
person lying down on a station staircase or platform is only a minor
inconvenience, not a significant harm that justifies prohibition. But many
people doing the same thing could easily shut the station down, and there is
no fair and practical way to regulate the level of lying down in the station to
avoid that outcome short of outright prohibition. In more complex cases, a
regulatory response may be more appropriate, as proponents of order
maintenance policing like Kelling have recognized. "Skillful order
maintenance activities," Kelling writes, "acknowledge that [activities like]
squeegeeing,.. . prostitution, panhandling, and drug dealing, will never be
eliminated, but good policing can determine the conditions under which and
how such activities can take place . . ,85 As Feinberg argues, this
enterprise is most legitimate when it aims to maintain the overall level of
harm below the crucial threshold where inconvenience fades into harm
while interfering as little as possible with socially or personally valuable
activities (e.g., by reserving alternative times and places for them).
86
Some examples of disorder that intuitively seem to justify police
intervention still cannot be accommodated within an expanded view of the
harm principle that encompasses accumulative harms. Public lewdness, for
example, is not usually harmful to anyone (at least not so significantly that
the harm principle offers a strong reason to regulate it), but it seems
84 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 229. Feinberg analyzes accumulative
harms in illuminating detail, and in the process he shows that not all behaviors that become
harmful through accumulation may legitimately be prohibited. Briefly, "the conduct should
be permitted"--despite the fact that harm would result if large numbers of people engaged in
the activity-"if in fact the likely number of persons who will engage in it falls below the
threshold of harm, unless all have an interest in engaging in the conduct, but sufficient
numbers refrain out of moral scruple or civic spirit." Id. at 244. This exception does not
apply to the cases I will be discussing.
85 KELLING, BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 45, at 36.
86 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 227-32, 244.
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inappropriate for police to ignore it entirely.87  In such cases it may be
appropriate to turn to the offense principle-the principle that "when public
conduct causes offense to someone, the fact of that offense is relevant to the
permissibility of the conduct.""8 To interpret this principle properly, it is
important to note that Feinberg uses "offense" as a term of art: "Offended
states" include a wide variety of harmless but unpleasant reactions
including anxiety, disgust, fear, and shame.89 The offense principle holds
that the criminal justice system may regulate some behaviors that cause
others to experience offended states. Feinberg has argued that an adequate
liberal theory should not restrict itself to the harm principle but should also
accept some version of the offense principle. Offenses "are nuisances,
making it difficult to enjoy one's work or leisure in a locality which one
cannot reasonably be expected to leave in the circumstances,"90 and for that
reason they may justify criminal justice attention.
At the same time, Feinberg recognizes the danger the offense principle
holds, in that it may justify an overly broad range of criminal justice
intervention, so he advises caution in its application:
People take offense-perfectly genuine offense-at many socially useful or even
necessary activities, from commercial advertisement to inane chatter. Moreover,
bigoted prejudices of a very widespread kind (e.g., against interracial couples strolling
hand in hand down the main street of a town in the deep South) can lead onlookers to
be disgusted and shocked, even "morally" repelled, by perfectly innocent activities,
and we should be loath to permit their groundless repugnance to outweigh the
innocence of the offending conduct. For these and similar reasons, the offense
principle must be formulated in a very precise way, and supplemented by appropriate
standards or mediating maxims so as not to open the door to wholesale and intuitively
unwarranted legal interference.
87 As my parenthetical qualification suggests, the distinction between offenses and minor
harms is often hard to draw, and I will not distinguish carefully between them in the
discussion that follows. Feinberg himself describes the distinction as "to some degree
arbitrary." Id. at 46. This imprecision is not important because Feinberg uses almost exactly
the same language to develop many of the "mediating maxims" that he would apply to minor
harms as he uses to develop the maxims appropriate for mere "offenses." Compare id. at 50,
with FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 34. On the precise relationship
between minor harms and offenses, see FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 45-51.
88 FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 26.
89 Id. at 1.
' Id. at 22.
91 Id. at 25-26.
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In response to this worry, Feinberg nominates a number of factors that must
be considered in applying the offense principle:
92
The extent of the offense, which consists of "the intensity and durability of the
repugnance produced, and the extent to which repugnance could be anticipated to be
the general reaction of strangers to the conduct displayed or represented (conduct
offensive only to persons with an abnormal susceptibility to offense would not count
as very offensive);"
The avoidability of the offense, that is, "the ease with which unwilling witnesses can
avoid the offensive displays;" at one extreme, it is rarely appropriate to prohibit
offense to those who consent to be offended, while at the other, captive observers
deserve special consideration;
The value of the offending activity, as comprised by its "personal importance to the
actors themselves and its social value generally;"
"[T]he availability of alternative times and places where the conduct in question
would cause less offense;" and
The motives that drive the offending activity-particularly "the extent, if any, to
which the offense is caused with spiteful motives."
93
It is particularly important to analyze the extent of the offense, the value of
the offending activity, and the availability of alternative times and places to
perform it.
Analyzing the extent of the offense can be particularly difficult, but
one important piece of evidence has to do with how widespread the
offended reaction is-whether a behavior offends most people or only those
with abnormal susceptibility. As Feinberg puts it, "the more fragile our
sensitive sufferer's psyche, the less protection he can expect from the
criminal law . . . . If a mere sneeze causes a glass window to break, we
should blame the weakness or brittleness of the glass and not the sneeze.,94
Thus, "the more widespread the offense . . . the stronger the case for
prohibition of the conduct that produces it, that is, the weightier must be the
considerations on the other side to counterbalance it." 95  In the case of
disorder, it is primarily those potentially disorderly behaviors that offend a
wide cross-section of people rather than the skittish few that may justify
police intervention. The important role of survey research is obvious here,
92 Id. at 25-47. The list that follows is condensed from page twenty-six, and all the
quotations appear on that page.
9' Id. at 26.
94 Id. at 34. There is one important exception: Those with abnormal susceptibility to an
offense deserve protection against those cruel souls who would intentionally exploit it. Id. at
33.
9' Id. at 27.
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since it can help to determine whether various possible examples of
"disorder" inspire offended mental states like fear, anxiety, and disgust in
many observers or only in a few. Wesley Skogan's work, which identified
a rough consensus that certain kinds of behavior are offensive to a broad
range of people, has laid an important foundation in this area.96 It would be
useful to follow it up with more detailed survey evidence about reactions to
common concrete examples of disorder. Note that the crucial question for
this research is not whether the residents of neighborhoods that are
generally high in disorder generally have high levels of fear.97 Instead it is
whether specific behaviors, in and of themselves, provoke offended mental
states like fear, anxiety, and disgust in a wide range of people or only in the
skittish few. Neuropsychological research that investigates the physical
bases of reactions like fear and disgust in the brain may offer useful
contributions to this inquiry by presenting relatively standardized ways of
identifying offended states.98
With this background, consider how the offense principle might help
to analyze New Haven's approach to public urination. The lenient
treatment of the man who relieves himself "modestly" in a side alley raises
complications to which I will return. But the offense principle clearly
justifies police intervention against his flagrant counterpart. Even if that
man's behavior is not positively harmful (if we put aside public health
concerns, for example), it almost certainly qualifies as the kind of offensive
behavior that justifies criminal justice intervention; we hardly need to wait
for survey results to guess whether this behavior is broadly offensive.
Moreover, although the need to relieve oneself somewhere is great-the
conduct "has value" to the person engaging in it-the man who does so
flagrantly has many alternatives that would cause less offense. At the least,
he could find a side alley and exercise some degree of modesty.
The man who relieves himself "modestly" in a side alley presents
different issues that help to clarify an important constraint on order
maintenance policing. Philosopher Jeremy Waldron has offered a useful
framework for analyzing this example and related order maintenance tactics
that impinge on the homeless. Waldron focuses on the implications of the
obvious fact that the homeless are defined by their lack of a home-that
there "is no place governed by a private property rule from which [they]
96 SKOGAN, supra note 14.
97 See TAYLOR, supra note 18; see also MAXFIELD, supra note 14. Such research may, of
course, be very important for other reasons.
98 E.g., Andrew Calder et al., Neuropsychology of Fear and Loathing, 2 NATURE
REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 352 (2001).
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may not at any time be excluded as a result of someone else's say-so."'99
This observation has an important implication for our understanding of
freedom: when an action is prohibited on public property, it is for all
practical purposes prohibited entirely for the homeless.
For a person who has no home, and has no expectation of being allowed into a private
office building or a restaurant, prohibitions on things like sleeping that apply
particularly to public places pose a special problem. For although there is no general
prohibition on acts of these types, still they are effectively ruled out altogether for
anyone who is homeless and who has no shelter to go to. The prohibition is
comprehensive in effect because of the cumulation, in the case of the homeless, of a
number of different bans, differently imposed. The rules of property prohibit the
homeless person from doing any of these acts in private, since there is no private place
that he has a right to be. And the rules governing public places prohibit him from
doing any of these acts in public, since that is how we have decided to regulate the use
of public places .... [S]ince freedom to perform a concrete action requires freedom
to perform it at some place, it follows that the homeless person does not have the
freedom to perform them. If sleeping is prohibited in public places, then sleeping is
comprehensively prohibited to the homeless. If urinating is prohibited in public
places (and if there are no public lavatories) then the homeless are simply unfree to
urinate.10o
In short, regulations that prohibit acts like urination, sleeping, lovemaking,
and cooking in public eliminate (for the homeless) the freedom to "tak[e]
care of these elementary needs themselves, quietly, with dignity, as
ordinary human beings."' 0 ' If such regulations do not violate a formal right
enumerated in the constitution, they violate something very similar, and
something that is bound up with formal rights as a precondition to their
exercise; indeed they restrict the ability of the homeless do things that are
"basic to the sustenance of a decent or healthy life, in some cases basic to
the sustenance of life itself."'0 2  Moreover, because the homeless lack
access to private space of their own, they lack "alternative times and
places" in which to carry out these essential activities.
This analysis is important for the issue at hand because it indicates that
outright prohibitions on public behaviors of these kinds fail Feinberg's
standards for the proper application of the offense principle in two ways.
Such bans may indeed prohibit something that is "offensive," but they
impinge on behavior that has very great value to the person engaged in it,
and (because the homeless lack access to private space of their own) they
leave no alternative times and places where it can be carried out.
99 Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 313
(1993).
'0o Id. at 328-29.
'o' Id. at 334.
102 Id. at 333.
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It is possible to read Waldron's article as a critique of regulations like
order maintenance policing, and it may have been intended that way. 10 3 It is
better read, however, as an account of the constraints within which humane
and legitimate order maintenance policies must operate. There are many
essential human activities that the homeless must perform somewhere, even
if they are offensive to others, so outright prohibition of them is
problematic. Instead of having "zero tolerance" for activities like public
urination, public drinking, and public sleeping or cooking, police should
regulate them so that the homeless may perform them somewhere, but in a
discrete way that contributes as little as possible to a sense of neighborhood
disorder. This conclusion indicates the need for a nuanced approach to
order maintenance that eschews general prohibitions and asks officers to
consider context closely. New Haven's policy guidelines, at least, are
consistent with this ideal, for they ask police to regulate the manner of
public urination and other instances of "disorder" without prohibiting them
entirely. By attending to context to determine how they should handle
particular cases (Is there a nearby public restroom that the man might have
used? Has he made an effort to be discrete?), they remain within the
boundaries of legitimate regulation that Waldron implies. Moreover, since
different communities offer different opportunities to meet these basic
needs, their scope for legitimate regulation of offensive behavior differs as
well: A community that provides adequate public restrooms has more
legitimate discretion to prohibit public urination than one that does not, and
a community with adequate public shelters is more justified in regulating
public sleeping than one that does not. Such differences offer a principled
basis for decisions to adopt different standards of "order" from community
to community.
As already noted, Kelling has elevated these ideas to general
principles, writing that good policing should not aim to "eliminate" many
disorderly activities but instead try to "determine the conditions under
which and how such activities can take place" and that appropriate
standards may vary from one community to another.10 4 Taken seriously,
this conception of order maintenance policing need not entail any
illegitimate intrusions on the quasi-rights Waldron identifies, and it lies
within the boundaries of Feinberg's guidelines for application of the offense
principle.
Order maintenance policing finds its best justification and its best
guiding principles in this understanding of liberal theory. We
103 Waldron mentions order maintenance measures adopted in the New York City
subways as an example of his concerns. Id. at 327-28.
104 KELLING, BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 45, at 36.
2004]
DA VID THA CHER
misunderstand liberalism if we believe it only concerns itself with behavior
that is seriously harmful in isolation. A sophisticated version of liberal
theory should extend its concern to some harmless offenses and to some
accumulative harms. Offenses and accumulative harms are more complex
targets for criminal justice concern, so it is not surprising that there has
been a tendency in criminal justice and academic circles to neglect them. It
is the merit of order maintenance policing to call police attention to this
difficult boundary area of problematic behavior-to remind police of the
role they should play in regulating unacceptable kinds of behavior that
make unfair use of public spaces, unduly undermine neighborhood
livability, and give unnecessary or inappropriate offense to a wide range of
people. At the same time, government should be careful as it moves away
from serious harms and towards mere offenses and less considerable harms
as objects of regulation. The latter do demand attention, but in a careful and
moderate way that incorporates the kinds of considerations that Feinberg
identified. It is essential to balance the extent and avoidability of an offense
or minor harm against the value the offender's behavior has to himself, and
to consider the availability of alternative times and places where the
offender might engage in the behavior. 10 5 It is the merit of the most
sophisticated brands of order maintenance policing-those that pay close
attention to the discretion that police must exercise when they maintain
order, and that offer detailed guidelines that shape the way police should
use that discretion-that they regulate disorder in a way that is sensitive to
these nuances. It is the flaw of cruder versions, like "zero tolerance"
policing, that they ignore these important subtleties.
ORDER MAINTENANCE AND THE POLICE
Before concluding, I need to consider one objection to this argument.
Even if public order is a desirable goal, it is reasonable to ask whether
police are the right institution to enforce it. Indeed, some scholars have
argued that the task of order maintenance should be assigned to community
105 Harcourt proposes a different way to analyze order maintenance policing, one that
essentially balances the harms of disorder against the harms caused by efforts to police it.
HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 209-14. In particular, he suggests balancing the "economic and
aesthetic harms" of disorder against the harms that order maintenance itself causes-
including the human and financial costs of misdemeanor arrests, the stigmatization of blacks,
and the possibility that order maintenance exacerbates police brutality. Id. at 211.
Harcourt's attention to the harms caused by order maintenance policing is important, but it
needs to be supplemented with something like the more complex balancing process Feinberg
suggests, which does not merely weigh harm against harm but instead offers a complex
framework for comparing the interests of those who are harmed or offended by conduct with
the interests of those who engage in it.
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institutions and informal community groups rather than the police. °6
Though this proposal deserves attention, it confronts two initial difficulties.
First, considerable evidence suggests that informal sanctions by community
institutions work badly without formal sanctions to back them up.'07
Second, it is not clear whether informal community institutions acting alone
can be held sufficiently accountable for the exercise of this delicate social
control function. In this connection, it is surprising to find a Foucauldian
such as Harcourt proposing that community institutions rather than police
should bear primary responsibility for controlling disorder.0 8 Foucault was
notoriously reluctant to state and defend his own normative views, but his
general discomfort with disciplinary power exercised through the carceral
network (i.e., institutions of social control outside the formal justice system,
such as schools, factories, and social work agencies) was obvious. 109 One
of his major contributions was to call attention to the dangers inherent in the
informal and distributed exercise of power, which (unlike centralized
juridical power) risks flying under the radar screen of our awareness.
"[T]he carceral pyramid gives to the power to inflict legal punishment a
context in which it appears to be free of all excess and all violence... "
Foucault wrote; for that reason, the power it exercises is "hidden," and "[a]s
a result, justice no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is
bound up with its practice."' 10 If society delegates the order maintenance
function to community institutions like "park-keepers," "station guards,"
and "church organizations"' 1 ' without formal involvement and oversight by
more visible and arguably more accountable institutions like the police,
there is a danger that justice will no longer take responsibility for the power
bound up with its practice.
III. CONCLUSION
Because offenses and accumulative harms are ambiguous and
uncertain phenomena, there is a tendency for scholars and practitioners to
neglect them. Where the concept of serious harm appears fairly clear-cut,
106 E.g., id. at 221-24; Roger Matthews, Replacing 'Broken Windows', in ISSUES IN
REALIST CRIMINOLOGY 19 (Roger Matthews & Jock Young eds., 1992).
107 ROBERT K. YIN et al., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PATROLLING THE NEIGHBORHOOD BEAT
(1976); Janet Foster, Informal Social Control and Community Crime Prevention, 35 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 563 (1995); Tim Hope, Community Crime Prevention, in 19 CRIME & JUST.
21 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1995).
108 HARCOURT, supra note 17, at 221-24.
109 For an explication of this aspect of Foucault's critique see ANDREW POLSKY, RISE OF
THE THERAPEUTIC STATE (1991).
110 FOUCAULT, supra note 48, at 302, 09.
1 Matthews, supra note 106, at 39.
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the concepts of accumulative harm and offense raise difficult normative
questions about which behaviors they encompass, when the desire to
regulate them should give way to other interests, and what kind of
regulations are appropriate when any are. It is tempting to try to avoid
these questions by turning to the apparent certainty of strong causal
reasoning-to ask not whether and how disorder that is offensive or
harmful in accumulation should be regulated in and of itself, but whether it
causes the kinds of serious harm that everyone already agrees should be
reduced. We should resist this temptation for the reasons given in the first
section of this paper. Strong causal arguments rarely succeed to the degree
needed," 2 and even if they did, it is not clear that they would justify
restrictions on otherwise innocuous behavior because it is usually
inappropriate to punish someone for unintentionally causing someone else
to commit a serious crime voluntarily."3
When the promises of strong causal reasoning fade, it will be
necessary to revisit questions about the intrinsic merits of order
maintenance policing. This paper has proposed one way of doing so-one
that focuses less on testing the strong causal broken windows theory and
more on ethnographic description of order maintenance practice, together
with normative analysis of the political ideals it implicates. It is not hard to
see how this approach might apply more broadly to other criminal justice
topics. In this respect, the order maintenance case offers a concrete
example of how scholarship might contribute to policy debate by analyzing
the intrinsic merits of criminal justice policies rather than their indirect
effects on crime. In Rein and Winship's language," 14 the order maintenance
case suggests by example how scholarship can move beyond strong causal
reasoning and thereby avoid the dangers associated with its use.
Social scientists may be uncomfortable with this argument, which may
seem to discount their central tool of causal analysis.' 15  This paper's
argument does not, however, imply that social scientists and other scholars
can make no contribution to the study of order maintenance policing and
other criminal justice policy issues. Most simply, I have not argued that
causal analysis is inappropriate; I have only argued that what Rein and
112 See Rein & Winship, supra note 4.
113 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 232-43; HART & HONOREE, supra note
30, at 129-51.
114 See Rein & Winship, supra note 4.
115 On the centrality of causal analysis in social science, see MAX WEBER, Science as
Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 129, at 144-45, 151 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds.,
1958) and MAX WEBER, The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics,
in MAX WEBER ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1, at 26 (Edward A. Shils
and Henry A. Finch, eds., 1949) [hereinafter WEBER, The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality'].
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Winship call "strong causal reasoning"-causal analysis that aims to
identify large indirect effects produced through complex causal chains-is
unlikely to offer clear-cut advice for policy. That conclusion leaves
substantial room for social science analysis in policy research. In
particular, there remains an important role for "weak" causal analyses that
do not rely on long causal chains-notably those that investigate whether
order maintenance policing has a direct effect on order. 16 Moreover,
although strong causal arguments may have limited implications for policy,
they still hold considerable interest for basic science. Complex, surprising
theories like the broken windows theory are intellectually fascinating, and
such theories will always play a role in social science. I have only argued
that we should not expect they will support clear-cut policy arguments; to
the extent that they contribute to policy at all, they are more likely to inform
careful and modest cost-effectiveness analyses rather than open-and-shut
cases in policy argumentation. In these respects, this paper's argument
leaves considerable room for the use of causal analysis in the study of order
maintenance policing, as well as other policy questions in criminal justice.
Nevertheless, my argument does give reasons to conclude
(notwithstanding the contrary views of Max Weber)' 1 7 that causal analysis
does not offer the only way for social scientists and other scholars to
contribute to knowledge about social problems like crime and disorder. A
full understanding of the intrinsic value of order maintenance requires two
kinds of contributions that scholars are particularly well-situated to make,
but that do not primarily involve causal analysis. The first is ethnographic
research, which contributes to the analysis of order maintenance policing by
systematically describing the kinds of situations that police might
potentially treat as disorderly and the kinds of actions they might take to
regulate it. Such thick description is an essential first step for normative
analysis for the reasons I have given. It extends our understanding of the
legitimate scope for order maintenance policing by helping to develop a
moral taxonomy of order and disorder.18 The second kind of contribution
is normative analysis, which can aid our intuition when we are unsure
whether and how police should respond to hard cases that may or may not
justify criminal justice intervention. By drawing on a sufficiently
sophisticated understanding of liberal political theory-one that recognizes
reasons to regulate harmless behavior that is broadly offensive, or minor
116 E.g., Katz et al., supra note 3.
117 See WEBER, The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality ", supra note 114.
118 Cf JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 36; see Thacher, supra note 60.
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harms that accumulate to create more significant harms" 9-scholars can
help determine whether and how police are justified in taking action against
disorder. This kind of ethnographic study and normative analysis are the
most pressing areas for future research about order maintenance policing,
and indeed about many other areas of public policy.
119 See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2; see also FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO
OTHERS, supra note 2.
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